



# **Risk Analysis for Mergers, Acquisitions, and Asset Valuation**

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# Using Market Data in Risk Analysis

## ■ Agenda

- Data Availability
- The Value of Data-Informed Risk Analysis
- Capital Expenditure and Regulatory Risk Analysis Applications Using Market Data

# Using Market Data in Risk Analysis

- Data Availability
  - Why Market Data?
  - The Rise of Data
  - Market Centers
  - Important Characteristics and Limitations
- The Value of Data-Informed Risk Analysis
- Capital Expenditure and Regulatory Risk Analysis Applications Using Market Data

# Why Market Data?

## ■ Practical Reasons

- Market data provide the clearest picture of what **actual** firms are paying for **actual** commodities
  - No subjectivity
- We can shift from **what should this asset be worth?** to **what is this asset worth?**
  - Equilibrium in electricity markets can be fragile and elusive

## ■ Strategic Reasons

- Prices as information (volume and liquidity)
- Market data tell us how markets evolve


## ■ Bottom Line

- Using actual market data produces more accurate values and improves management and investor decision making


# The Rise of Data

- From System  $\lambda$  to Energy Clearing Prices (ECP)
  - Volatility is a consequence of healthy, competitive markets
- Most Important Data for Risk Analysis
  - Primary Markets
    - Energy
    - Capacity
    - Ancillary Services
  - Secondary Markets
    - Emissions Credits
    - Fuel Prices

NEPOOL Data: Introduction of ECP



# Data Availability




# Energy Products

- Four Key Features Distinguishing Types of Prices
  - Zonal vs Nodal
    - Zonal reduces market power potential; nodal is theoretically more efficient
  - Spot vs Long-Term Bilateral
    - Spot markets promote competition, but bilateral contracting moderates volatility
  - Portfolio vs Unit-Specific Scheduling and Bidding
    - Portfolio scheduling allows more flexibility, but makes it harder to manage congestion
  - FTR (Financial Transmission Rights) vs TCR (Transmission Congestion Rights)
    - Both rights are financial, not physical

# Energy Products

- Because of the physical characteristics of electricity, the price to *generate* electricity must be considered together with the price to *transport* it
- Locational Marginal Prices
  - $LMP = \text{Energy} + \text{Congestion} + \text{Losses}$
- Energy: *marginal costs of generation*
- Congestion: *compensation for out-of-merit-order dispatch due to transmission constraints*
- Losses: *cost of line losses*
  
- The congestion premiums may be substantial during peak load periods for some regions (compared to equilibrium forecasts of marginal fuel-based energy prices)





# Contrasting Energy Markets

## ■ ERCOT

- Zonal: 4 zones
- Bilateral market with real-time balancing
- Portfolio scheduling and bidding
- TCRs

## ■ PJM


- Real-time and day-ahead markets
- Hourly LMPs
- Nodal:
  - 12 transmission zones
  - 4 interfaces
  - 4 hubs
  - 1 overall load-weighted average
- FTRs

# Capacity Products

- Used to ensure that sufficient resources exist and are accessible to system to satisfy peak load *and* protect reliability
- Installed Capacity (PJM 1/1/1999 – 5/31/1999)
  - Total electricity resources required to meet peak system load over the planning period in accordance with reliability standards
- Unforced Capacity (PJM since 6/1/1999)
  - Effective available capacity of a resource when forced outages (planned and scheduled maintenance) are taken into account
  - $UCAP = ICAP \times \text{Average Unforced Outage Rate}$
- Daily, Monthly, Multi-Month contract terms available for unforced capacity clearing market

# Capacity Prices

Capacity Credit Market - PJM East



# Developing Markets

## ■ Ancillary Services

- Real-power Balancing (frequency stability)
- Voltage Stability (for customers)
- Transmission Security
- Economic Dispatch
- Financial Trade Enforcement
- Black Start Capacity/Regulation

## ■ Where will we see markets form?

- Great interest in reducing the “socialized” nature of these services

# Ancillary Service Markets (?)

- Real-power Balancing (frequency stability)
  - The most “well-developed” ancillary service market; “spinning” reserves
- Voltage Stability (for customers)
  - No possibility for bilateral market-making because of the externalities (how A and B trade with each other can affect C)
  - Centralized exchange in parallel with real-time market is possible, but difficult due to the difficulty in transmitting reactive power (highly localized; losses are about 10x greater than real power)
- Transmission Security
  - Service must be provided by the ISO
  - ISO can sell transmission rights, but physical coordination in real-time is required
  - The “security-constrained unit commitment problem” is very difficult
- Economic Dispatch
  - Centralized day-ahead power exchanges (like PJM)
- Financial Trade Enforcement
  - ISO must provide (much like CBOT’s OCC)
- Black Start Capacity/Regulation
  - Centralized market is possible

# CAUTION

- Apples and Oranges: Market Comparability
  - Zonal vs Nodal Pricing
  - On- vs Off-Peak Pricing
  - Firm vs Non-Firm Pricing
  - “Into” Pricing/Congestion
- Liquidity and the informational content of prices
  - “Representative,” “Indicative,” and one-sided prices
- Past as prologue?
  - What *doesn't* looking at the past tell us?

# Using Market Data in Risk Analysis

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- The Value of Data-Informed Risk Analysis
  - Differences between typical assumptions and actual data
  - The valuation impact of using actual market data
- Capital Expenditure and Regulatory Risk Analysis Applications Using Market Data


# Standard Modeling Assumptions

- Prices are lognormal
- Volatility is constant
  
- Are these valid?
- How big are the differences?




# Hypothetical vs Actual Data


Energy Electricity Prices




Henry Hub Gas Prices



Error Between Hypothetical and Actual




Error Between Hypothetical and Actual




# Hypothetical vs Actual Data

Time-Dependent Volatility




Clustered Volatility



# More on Volatility...

## Even the Volatility Is Volatile

Daily price variability vs. GARCH\* (Into Cinergy & ComEd).  
(January 1999 to July 2002)



# The Valuation Impact of Hypothetical vs Actual Data

- “...but does it matter?”
- Estimate the spark spread-determined capacity factor of a GTCC unit buying at Henry Hub and selling into Entergy
- 8500 heat rate, daily discretion
- Use *actual* 2002 data vs *traditional* assumptions
- Test against actual 2003 data (January-May)

# Actual 2002 Results

	Average	Std. Deviation
Entergy	\$ 28.50	\$ 5.33
Henry Hub	\$ 3.36	\$ 0.72

Capacity Factor

52.70% (whole year)


Capacity Factor

56.60% (January - May only)

***...but what about 2003?***

# Comparative 2003 Forecasts

- Conventional “Normal” Assumption
  - Prices follow “conventional” distribution, based on 2002 mean and standard deviation
  - **Capacity Factor 49.1%**
- Simulation Approach with Historical Data
  - Prices incorporate all aspects of historical data (mean-reversion, stochastic volatility, etc.), as well as more realistic distributional forms
  - **Capacity Factor 18.5% ± 0.6%**
  - ▶ **Simulation also provides more data about plant operation**
- Actual January-May 2003 Plant Performance
  - **Capacity Factor 17.9%**



# Using Market Data in Risk Analysis

- Data Availability
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- Capital Expenditure and Regulatory Risk Analysis  
Applications Using Market Data
  - Economic Analysis of Emissions-Related Capital Expenditures
  - Regulatory Risk Analysis of Fleet Configuration Decision-Making

# Analysis Overview


- Analysis uses classical economic marginal cost techniques coupled with actual market and operational data
  - Only install new equipment if the average total cost (including capital) is less than marginal cost of production with the existing configuration (assumes capital is sunk for existing assets).
- Actual historical data can be incorporated for:
  - Emissions prices
  - Fuel prices
  - Operational data on emissions rates
- Questions
  - What equipment should be installed?
  - What market events would cause managers to change their decisions?
  - How do emissions-related capital expenditures affect project values?
  - How should managers allocate a limited capital budget across an entire fleet, given that future regulatory events are uncertain?



# Single-Configuration, Single-Plant Example: NO<sub>x</sub>



# Analysis of Multiple Possible Configurations for a Particular Plant



# Fleet-Level Regulatory Risk Analysis

## Optimal Configuration in Each Scenario

	State 1	State 2	State 3	...	State n	# Configs
<b>Plant 1</b>	SB	Dry + SB	SB	...	SB	2
<b>Plant 2</b>	OFA	SB	OFA	...	OFA	2
<b>Plant 3</b>	SCR	Biomass	OFA	...	OFA	3
<b>Plant 4</b>	SB	Biomass	SB	...	SB	1
<b>Plant 5</b>	As Is	As Is	As Is	...	As Is	1
<b>Plant 6</b>	SCR	Biomass	SCR	...	SCR	3
<b>Plant 7</b>	As Is	Biomass	As Is	...	As Is	3
<b>Plant 8</b>	As Is	As Is	As Is	...	As Is	1
<b>Plant 9</b>	As Is	As Is	As Is	...	As Is	1
<b>Plant 10</b>	As Is	As Is	As Is	...	As Is	1

Plants with few optimal configurations are easier to plan future operations

# Dominant Strategy Regret Table

**\$/MWh Cost of Using Dominant Configuration in Each Scenario**


	State 1	State 2	State 3	...	State n	Dominant
Plant 1	\$ -	\$ (0.61)	\$ -	...	\$ -	SB
Plant 2	\$ -	\$ (39.09)	\$ -	...	\$ -	SCR
Plant 3	\$ -	\$ (0.95)	\$ -	...	\$ -	SB
Plant 4	\$ -	\$ (47.37)	\$ -	...	\$ -	As Is
Plant 5	\$ -	\$ (4.05)	\$ -	...	\$ -	OFA
Plant 6	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	...	\$ -	As Is
Plant 7	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	...	\$ -	As Is
Plant 8	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	...	\$ -	As Is
Plant 9	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	...	\$ -	As Is
Plant 10	\$ (0.29)	\$ (15.70)	\$ -	...	\$ -	OFA
Yearly Costs	\$ (199,661)	\$ (41,557,347)	\$ -	...	\$ -	



Uncertainty over scenario probabilities can be addressed through minimizing the expected future regret given that *another* scenario were chosen. The State 2 scenario carries with it the potential for substantial regret (and is therefore deserving of considerable further analysis).

# Summary

- Most regions now have a wide variety of data available
- New players in energy markets are used to using historical data in their analyses – generators will be judged increasingly by data-intensive metrics, rather than by strategic value
- As markets continue to evolve, new sources of data will become available, providing investors with new ways of analyzing investment values and risks
- Careful use of historical data can significantly improve decision-making accuracy
- Data availability facilitates quantitative risk analysis and simulation-based valuation techniques; these are the new standards



# Core Practice Areas

<b>Power</b>	<b>Energy</b>	<b>Industrial Facilities</b>
Electric Generation	Coal	Chemical
Transmission	Alternative Fuels	Waste Processing
Distribution	Natural Gas	Steel

# Recent Clients

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